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Regulating Corporate Governance in China and Hong Kong: Do Chinese values and 
ethics have a place in the age of Globalization?1 
 
Angus Young2 
School of Accountancy, Faculty of Business, 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia 
Abstract: 
Much has been said about the convergence of corporate governance and regulations. The 
underlying assumptions of this phenomenon are driven by globalisation and the dominance of 
the Anglo-US model of corporate governance. Since the Asian crisis in 1997, Hong Kong and 
perhaps to a less extend Mainland China, had amended both Company laws and Stock 
Exchange Listing Rules obligations, arguably, mirroring provisions and rules in the UK and 
US. However, there has been a small amount of literature in law drawing from cross cultural 
management asking the question - is Western governance and regulation appropriate for the 
East? This paper will approach this issue from a different mindset, instead of drawing 
distinctions about East and West, a meta-regulatory framework will attempt to incorporate 
Western ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ laws with Asian ethical values. The aim is to combine laws and 
ethics thereby enhancing corporate governance and, improve compliance of those rules by 
adapting Chinese ethical values like Confucianism into the regulatory system. The 
overarching goal of this exercise is to adapt the wisdom of Chinese ethics into regulatory 
guidelines to suit the modern global market. 
 
Introduction: 
This paper examines the critical issue of – does Chinese values matter in regulating corporate 
governance in China and Hong Kong? As much of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 
more recently the global economic crisis in 2008 had focus on enhancing corporate 
governance and accountability of directors, little has been said about developing a system that 
can be adapted to suit the culture and values of particular jurisdictions. China and Hong Kong 
do not necessarily share the same problems with the UK, US or Australia so why adopt 
measures instituted by these countries? And yet, it would be unwise to ignore the lessons 
learnt and more important new regulatory innovation to improve the effectiveness of 
regulatory measures. Hence, the logical course of action is to incorporate norms and values 
that are unique to China and Hong Kong, while adopting the innovations in regulatory 
strategies to improve overall effectiveness and compliance. This shall be explored in three 
key sections, starting with the deconstruction of what corporate governance is, then, the 
concept of paternalistic governance and Confucian ethics, followed by a discussion on meta-
regulation. 
                                                 
1 Note this is a work-in-progress, please do not quote without consulting the author. 
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Deconstructing the Multiplicities of Corporate Governance: 
Corporate governance is a term commonly used by economists, lawyers, accountants, and 
organisational theorists to examine how corporations are directed and controlled,3 or 
sometimes broadly characterised as a system of checks and balances to ensure that decision 
makers are accountable to the stakeholders.4 Even though it sounds simple and 
straightforward, in reality it is a complex and dynamic concept that is multi-dimensional and 
evolving. For example, in the aftermath of the recent global economic crisis in 2008, ‗risk‘ 
has been added to the growing list tagged to corporate governance.  
 
Some of the more commonly discussed theories are: agency, stakeholders, stewardship, 
managerial hegemony, and resource dependency.
5
 Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to go into the details, it is worth noting that each of the theories builds on a set of 
assumptions, often a victim of the latest trends or grand narratives. The result is, on one end 
of the spectrum is agency theory, it sets out corporate governance in a two dimensional 
world, where the real world is reduced into crude and rudimentary classroom experiment 
because the thesis rest upon the notion that a company is made up of two groups of actors 
known as principals and agents. At the other end is resource dependency theory which 
envisages a company is steered by developments outside the organisation. The reason for 
such diverse simplicities according to Pettigrew is because corporate governance research 
lacks coherence empirically, methodologically or theoretically,
6
 which might help to explain 
why this label has been misrepresented as a ‗cure‘ for all corporate ills.  
 
While it would be hasty and ill informed to write off or dispel the authenticity of any of these 
theories, the array of theories attest to the complexities of governing a corporation, thus there 
is no definitive or ‗one size fits all‘ model. The reality might well mean that there is a 
juxtaposed of theories. Consequently, it would be fair to say corporate governance is a multi 
                                                 
3 John Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, (2001) 3 
4 Jill Solomon and Anis Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (2004) 12-15 
5
 See Thomas Clarke, Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate 
Governance (2004) and Richard Ziolkowski, A Re-Examination of Corporate Governance: Concepts, models, 
theories and Future Direction (PhD Thesis, University of Canberra, 2005)  
6
 Andrew Pettigrew, ‗On studying managerial elites‘ (1992) 13 (1) Strategic Management Journal, 163-82 
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dimensional issue.
7
 More fundamental, regardless of which theories one subscribes to, the 
accountability of the board of directors is a cornerstone of effective governance. Therefore, 
improving accountability of the board as well as the individual director is crucial. 
 
The modern board is not just about a group of people sitting in a room making decisions. The 
demands on boards range from many foreseeable to unforeseeable challenges, and in the 
global era where the market is borderless, the pressure to perform under intense competition 
adds to the onus of the task. Although this does not constitute an excuse or limit scope of 
responsibilities of directors, it meant that effective governance calls for greater vigilance, to 
respond to market volatility and pressures. But to improve board accountability, it is 
important to identify what the board does. And given the array of board responsibilities, 
dividing their tasks along functional lines would permit greater clarity on the allocation of 
duties, obligations and liabilities. After a survey of management and organisational books on 
company directors, one could broadly ‗pigeonhole‘ the duties into three functions: 
"structural", "operational", and "relational" (see figure 1).
8
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Angus Corbett and Steven Bottomley, ‗Regulating Corporate Governance‘, in Christine Parker, Colin Scott, 
Nicola Lacey, and John Braithwaite (ed), Regulating Law (2004) 60-81. 
8
 Angus Young, ‗Rethinking the Fundamental of Corporate Governance: The relevance of culture in the global 
age‘ (2008) 29 (8) The Company Lawyer, 168, 169 and Michael Adams and Angus Young, ‗Regulating 
Corporate Governors: Rethinking Board Responsibilities and Liabilities‘ (2007) 59 (1) Keeping Good 
Companies, 11 
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Source: Angus Young, ‗Regulating non-executive directors in Australia: a socio-legal 
approach‘ (2008) 29 (11) The Company Lawyer, p. 325 
 
 
The structural elements are concerned with board structure and processes, which are easily 
identifiable. Getting it ‗right‘ will depend on a host of internal and external factors. Some are 
straightforward; others can be more problematic. In essence, the structural aspect of 
governance is about due process and a system of checks and balances. For example, on board 
committees, Carter and Lorsh write, ‗the rationale for establishing board committees is to 
divide up the work among board members so that they can accomplish more in their limited 
time. Committees allow directors to develop specialized understanding and to delve more 
deeply into specific issues.‘9 
 
Operational considerations consist of strategy formulation, policymaking, monitoring, and 
supervising management, and risk assessment.
10
 Since operational matters are made up of 
matters that objectively determined as well as value judgements that are subjectively chosen, 
thus directors‘ personal experiences are crucial in decision-making. Hence, diligence is 
crucial.  As for supervision, vigilance is paramount. Whilst best practices guides could help 
with the development of better policies and protocols, many operational matters are involve 
subjective judgements drawn from directors‘ experiences and business acumen.11  
 
Relational issues are matters to do with people. Dealing with people is not straightforward, it 
is interactive and dynamic, which includes matters like leadership, corporate social 
responsibility, stakeholder communications, and relationship management. Since human 
relations are by nature more complex and challenging, there are universal templates or 
solutions available. A good practice would be actively engage with various stakeholders and 
address their concerns. Besides, changing circumstances or personal interest could tempt 
directors to adopt creative ways to bypass regulatory and procedural safeguards. This 
suggests that the governing and managing relationships are challenging and dynamic. 
Therefore, values especially ethical values and social norms could influence how relational 
matters are dissimilar across companies and countries. More importantly this is where 
                                                 
9
 Colin Carter and Jay Lorsch, Designing Corporate Boards for a Complex World: Back to the Drawing Board 
(2004) 8 
10
 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices (2009) 38-9 
11
 Angus Young, ‗Regulating Non-Executive Directors in Australia: A Socio-legal Approach,‘ (2008) 29 (11) 
Company Lawyer, 323, 324-5 
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cultural values play a critical role. Human to human relationships, interactions, and 
communications are heavily influences by culture, as demonstrated by cross cultural 
management research, for example, findings of Hofstede.12   
 
Consequently, to improve the accountability of director by developing robust rules and best 
practices to address the three aspects of board functions would, in theory, enhance corporate 
governance. Two questions emerge, first should the law regulate all aspects of board 
functions, and second can the law regulate these functions adequately? The short answer is – 
yes and no. ‗Yes‘, concerning the general duties of directors, these duties are broad in scope, 
but specific in how the law defines those duties. ‗No‘ because there are limitations of the law 
can do to shape behaviour and its ability to cover every contingency. Also the law, as a 
regulatory tool cannot micro-manage every aspect of board functions. Besides, the law should 
not and cannot replace good governance practises and values. Therefore, apart from legal 
obligations, quasi-legal and non-legal regulatory instruments could be considered as 
complementary or supporting mechanisms to regulate the behaviour of directors.  
 
Adding to this is the open ended debate about converging corporate governance regime. 
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that corporate governance and laws are converging 
international.13 They claim that there are three key factors driving consensus on a ‗standard 
model; ‗the failure of alternative models; the competitive pressures of global commerce; and 
the shift of interest groups influence in favour or an emerging shareholder class.‘14  
 
Hansmann and Kraakman also claim that globalisation and economic integration where 
competitive forces and efficiency of capital is promoting convergence towards the 
shareholder-oriented model.15 Furthermore the rise of shareholder class around the world, the 
diffusion of equity ownership, and the shift in balance towards public shareholders is 
prompting greater convergence in governance.16 Much of the premises of these statements 
appear to be based on anecdotal evidence at best, given that ownership structure of public and 
private corporations in Europe and Asia‘s continue to be concentrated (block shares) held by 
                                                 
12
 See subsequent paragraphs below. Also see Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations, Software of the 
mind: Intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival (1994) 
13
 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‗The end of history for corporate law‘ in Jeffery Gordon and Mark 
Roe (ed.) Convergence and persistence in corporate governance (2004) 34-5 
14
 Ibid, 36 
15
 Ibid, 45-48 
16
 Ibid 48-50 
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individuals (founders) or families, this is more acute in Hong Kong and is a growing trend 
China.17 Bebchuk and Roe assert, ‗what is clear is that, notwithstanding the forces of 
globalization and efficiency, some key differences in corporate structures among countries 
have persisted.‘18 Pinto notes, 
Globalization has raised the issues of whether a particular model is optimal and given 
competition there may be some form of convergence.  Just as trade globalization has 
raised significant economic and policy issues, comparative corporate governance 
studies raise some similar issues.19     
 
Even if some levels of convergence exist, Gilson argues that there are at a functional level but 
not at a formal level.20 He notes, ‗functional convergence occurs at a high level of 
generality.‘21 This meant substantive and in-depth convergence is difficult to achieve 
especially on the global scale.  
 
The path dependence model challenges the convergence thesis.22 In essence, path dependency 
draws from a political premise by noting traditional European political ideology in social 
democracy would not sanction the creation of strong securities market. Another strand of path 
dependence is ‗rent protection‘ thesis. If private benefits of control were high, concentrated 
ownership would dictate over dispersed ownership.23 This is also known as structure-driven 
path dependence.24 Sunk adaptive costs could influence the efficient choice of a corporate 
ownership.25 Other considerations like complementarities between entities and institutions, 
network externalities, and endowment effects would impact on ownership structures.26 
Persistence of existing structures can be due to retention of rent seeking opportunity.27 The 
other path dependence thesis is rule driven. When countries have different rules corporate 
structure, it could produce difference patterns of corporate structures.28  
 
                                                 
17
 Diane Denis and John McConnell, ‗International Corporate Governance‘ in K. Keasey, S. Thompson, and M. 
Wright (ed.) Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons (2005) 259-64  
18
 Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe, ‗A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance‘ in 
Jeffery Gordon and Mark Roe (ed.) Convergence and persistence in corporate governance (2004) 77 
19
 Arthur Pinto, ‗Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance‘, (Research Paper No. 36, 
Brooklyn Law School, 2005) 32 
20
 Ronald Gilson, ‗Globalizing corporate governance: convergence of form or function‘ in Jeffery Gordon and 
Mark Roe (ed.) Convergence and persistence in corporate governance (2004) 137-8 
21
 Ibid 138 
22
 Bebchuk and Roe, above n. 17, 69 
23
 Ibid 
24
 Ibid 77-78 
25
 Ibid 79 
26
 Ibid 80-81 
27
 Ibid 82 
28
 Ibid 93 
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In a rejoinder to the above on board functions, even if there is convergence in the regulation 
of board structural and operational matters, relational aspects will always present a challenge. 
The core legal duty of a director is to be loyal to the company, yet the notion of loyalty is a 
subjective judgement with objective benchmarks, the interpretation culturally and norms 
driven. This is especially the case for Hong Kong and China, where traditional Chinese 
values have been embedded into the social norms and moral values. From a regulatory 
perspective, even if the laws in governance converge, this does not mean social norms will 
follow.29 Thus the effectiveness of corporate laws will require widely acceptance beyond 
superficial legal compliance – liken a ‗coalition of the willing‘.30   
 
Licth asserts that culture does matter in corporate governance and notes, 
 
A nation's culture can be perceived as the mother of all path dependencies. 
Figuratively, it means that a nation's culture might be more persistent than other 
factors believed to induce path dependence. Substantively, a nation's unique set of 
cultural values might indeed affect — in a chain of causality — the development of 
that nation's laws in general and its corporate governance system in particular.31 
 
For example, South Korea had recently underwent corporate governance reforms in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Licth writes  
The architects of corporate governance reforms may want to consider the idea of 
culturally compatible governance… [t]he far reaching reliance on American models 
may bring about some improvement. But Korean reformers could devise better 
corporate governance that draws on the country‘s huge social capital that its cultural 
endowment embodies.32 
Therefore, values inspired corporate governance practise ought to be a key consideration in 
developing a suitable and responsive regulatory framework for Asian countries. 
 
Paternalistic Governance and Confucian Values: 
                                                 
29
 David Charny ‗The politics of corporate convergence‘ in Jeffery Gordon and Mark Roe (ed.) Convergence 
and persistence in corporate governance (2004) 307 
30
 Lynn Stout, ‗On the Export of US-style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can a transplant take?‘ 
in Curtis Milhaupt (ed), Corporate Law and Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals (2003) 67 
31
 Amir Licth, ‗The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems‘, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, (2001) 26 (1) 149-50 
32
 Amir Licth, ‗Legal Plug-in: Cultural Distance, Cross- Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform‘, (2004) 22 
(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law, 232 
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Hofstede a pioneer in the field of cross-cultural management came up with 5 value 
dimensions identifying cultural and behavioural difference between countries.33 The most 
relevant value dimension to corporate governance is ‗power distance‘.34 This would impact 
on boardroom dynamics. According to Hofstede‘s findings, ‗Hong Kong‘s power distance 
score is 68 compared to the other Far East Asian countries average of 60.‘35 This indicates the 
inequality of power is high, the founder of the company or head of family of a Chinese family 
business in Hong Kong is more likely to dominate board decisions, or that his/her views 
would carry more weight irrespective of the official positions in the company.36 
 
Another finding unique to Asian countries according to Hofstede, is the influence of 
Confucian doctrines. Countries like Hong Kong that subscribe to Confucianism are thus 
stable based upon unequal relationship between people, the family is the prototype of all 
organisations, moral and relationship based managerial values.37 This implies governance 
preference in Asian countries tended to be stable and relationship based, and thus less 
transparent to third party. This mode of informal and personality centred governance is 
common in Asia, quite distinct from the structured, process-oriented, and ruled based 
governance in the West.38 
 
Redding found that Hong Kong‘s Chinese family owned businesses are similar to those 
Singapore and Taiwan, governed under a hierarchical structure with power central in the 
                                                 
33
 Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations, Software of the mind: Intercultural cooperation and its 
importance for survival (1994) 13-15. The 5 independent value dimensions are: power distance; uncertainty 
avoidance; individualism versus collectivism; masculinity versus femininity; long versus short-term orientation. 
The research is based on surveys from many countries over a 20-year period. The respondents were drawn from 
over 116,000 employees in IBM branches spanning across 50 countries. See Geert Hofstede, Cultures and 
Organizations, Software of the mind: Intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival (1994) 23-172.   
34
 It measures the dependence relationship between superiors and subordinates. In countries where power 
distance is small, Subordinates readily approach and contradict their superiors if they disagreed. Whereas if the 
power distance is large, a typical in Asian countries, the opposite will occur. See Geert Hofstede, Cultures and 
Organizations, Software of the mind: Intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival (1994) 27-28. 
35
 Geert Hofstede, Cultural Dimensions, <http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_hong_kong.shtml> at 20th 
March 2009. 
36
 Wai-Kei Wong, A Study of Corporate Governance Amongst Listed Chinese Family Enterprise in Hong Kong 
(PhD Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2001) 60-61. See below for more on this facet. 
37
 Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations, Software of the mind: Intercultural cooperation and its 
importance for survival (1994) 164-165. There are a number of weaknesses in Hofstede‘s model, it based on a 
single industry and there are a number of technical difficulties associated with the methodology of his research. 
See Richard Mead, International Management: Cross-Cultural Dimensions (3
rd
 ed., 2005) 47-49 
38
 S Li, S Park, and S Li, ‗The Transition from Relation-based to Rule-based Governance‘ (2004) 33(1) 
Organizational Dynamics 63 at 64-66. 
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hands of the head of the organisation, which he coins as ‗paternalism‘.39 The implications is 
that he/she is granted very high discretion and not questioned about why he/she adopts certain 
policy, the relationship between the ‗boss‘ and senior executive is often described as 
didactic.
40
  
Chen observes that,  
The typical Chinese business family is headed by either a patriarch or a matriarch – 
usually the individual who founded the business, or his or her direct descendants – 
and family members hold key positions within the business. This core business may 
then be linked to a web of subsidiaries and allied companies, typically owned by 
various members of the immediate and extended family. The family business thus 
emerges as a complex network of companies, with ownership distributed throughout 
the extended family, and often cross-held to create intrafamily dependencies.
41
  
And he describes the form of leadership style is authoritarian,42 where,  
The boss‘s concern with the retention of power is also reflected in the careful 
maintenance of a large power distance…[i]n Chinese family business system, 
subordinates are supposed to think what the boss is thinking and tailor their ideas 
accordingly. Dissenting opinions and proposals should be conveyed to the boss 
through private and personal channels, with respectful tone.
43
  
The justification for this centralised control is a moral one,44 where the emphasis is on 
hierarchical relationships not about processes or formal rules.45 In a typical hierarchical order 
of a Chinese family-owned business the founder or head of the family (usually holds both the 
positions of CEO and Chair) is at the top of the organisational structure, and the control is top 
down (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 
                                                 
39
 Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (1990) 156-169. 
40
 Gordon Redding, ‗The Conditional Relevance of Corporate Governance Advice in the Context of Asian 
Business Systems‘, (2004) 10 (3) Asia-Pacific Business Review, 272 at 285 
41
 Ming-Jer Chen, Inside Chinese Business: A Guide for Managers Worldwide (2001) 26. 
42
 Min Chen, Asian Management Systems (2
nd
 ed., 2004) 73. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Redding, above n. 39, 156. 
45
 Henry Yeung, Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards a Hybrid Capitalism (2004) 80. 
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Even in listed companies where there is a high concentration in ownership in the hands of 
Chinese families, those who possess strong associations with these families, especially those 
in the inner circles of business networks who have no direct stake in the listed companies are 
most likely to be appointed to the board as independent non-executive directors.
46
 Redding 
noted that, ‗the grafting on of new outsiders at a senior level in such organisations is 
particularly difficult, given the lengthy socialisation needed for understanding the 
organisation's core and often concealed features, but more particularly given the problem of 
time needed for the essential networking, not just outside but also inside the company.‘47  
 
                                                 
46
 Philip Lawton, ‗Berle and Means, Corporate Governance and Chinese Family Firms‘ (1996) 6(3) Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law, 348. 
47
 Redding, above n. 39, 218-219. 
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Even if independent non-executives are appointed to these listed entities in Hong Kong, in-
depth study of two companies by Wong found their access to information and ability to 
scrutinise the companies‘ accounts were limited.48 This suggests the role of independent non-
executive directors in Chinese family-owned listed companies might be more symbolic than 
functional. 
 
There are clear advantages and disadvantages of paternalistic governance. Since power is 
vested with the one person, so the speed of responding to external changes is relatively fast.
49
 
Hence, family-owned businesses can adapt more quickly to economic changes.
50
 Internal 
organisational efficiency can also be achieved with vertical control of paternalistic 
governance.
51
 The reliance on networks also generates horizontal efficiencies and 
cooperation between family-owned businesses.
52
 There are also cost savings as family 
members usually not paid well in small scale business enterprises. They do the work out of a 
sense of loyalty and social obligations.
53
 In addition, loans are usually from family members 
and relatives, at little to no interest charged.
54
 Finally, there is an expectation of benevolent 
leadership, which stems from Confucian ethics, where harmonious relationships are 
important and thus the emphasis on cooperation and avoidance of conflict is embedded into 
the organisational culture of family-owned businesses.
55
  
 
There are also many disadvantages. Since paternalistic leadership is authoritarian, the 
decisions made by the head of the company should not be questioned or debated over, which 
means the rationale of decisions are not always justifiable in an analytical manner.
56
 Instead, 
personal principles and experiences form the basis of certain decisions. It is not easily 
deciphered or understood by others.
57
 This leadership style also tends to repress professional 
                                                 
48
 Wai-Kei Wong, A Study of Corporate Governance Amongst Listed Chinese Family Enterprise in Hong Kong 
(PhD Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2001) 125-161. 
49
 Redding, above n. 39, 207. 
50
 Ibid, 221-225. 
51
 Ibid, 208-212. 
52
 Ibid, 213-217. 
53
 Richard Mead, International Management: Cross-Cultural Dimensions (3
rd
 ed., 2005) 281.  
54
 Ibid, 282-283. 
55
 Sonia El Kahal, Business in Asia Pacific: Text and Cases (2001) 134. 
56
 Angus Young, Grace Li, and Alex Lau, ‗Corporate Governance in China: The Role of the State and Ideology 
in Shaping Reforms‘ (2007) 28(7) The Company Lawyer, 204 
57
 Ibid, 204. 
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talents,
58
 so innovation and growth is limited by the lack of new blood and ideas.
59
 Non-
family employees are often left out of promotional opportunities, and have a low degree of 
loyal and responsibility towards the company.
60
 The lack of institutionalised successions plan 
also undermines the longevity of family-owned business.
61
 Another barrier Chinese family-
owned businesses face is limited access to finances. This is because they tend to use personal 
saving or loans from family members and extended relatives to fund their enterprise. In part, 
this is due to their reluctance to let outsiders examine their company‘s accounts. 62 Hence, 
these drawbacks limits the long term growth potential and many of these companies remain 
undercapitalise.  
 
The corporate governance implications for Chinese family businesses in Hong Kong are 
twofold. First, the power and decisions at the board would most likely be dominated by the 
chair or CEO, while stewardship theory might be relevant unlike in the West where the board 
empowers the CEO, the reverse is more likely to be true in Chinese family-owned businesses 
in Hong Kong. Second, since these companies are ‗ruled by one man‘ Western inspired 
governance structures, processes, protocols, and standards are not likely able to influence or 
shape the behaviour of these individuals beyond superficial compliance. 
 
At the outset, it is important to appreciate a few things about Confucius‘s writings. There 
three major pieces of works said to be by Confucius: The Analects, The Great Learning, and 
The Doctrine of the Mean, all of which were put together by Confucius former students after 
his death.
63
 The Analects – was a compilation of conversations Confucius had with his 
students and other scholars, thus the meaning of certain concepts would vary.
64
 In addition, 
                                                 
58
 Min Chen, Asian Management Systems (2
nd
 ed., 2004) 76. 
59
 Redding, above n. 39, 132-133. 
60
 Chen, above n. 57, 76. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Richard Mead, International Management: Cross-Cultural Dimensions (3
rd
 ed., 2005) 282-283. 
63
 James Legge, Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean (1971) 1-
21. Note, there is a fourth book written by Mencius, titled ‗The Works of Mencius‘ is arguably one of the most 
quoted authority on Confucius. Even though, Mencius was not Confucius‘s students, his work appeared after 
Confucius‘s death – some contemporary authors would list Mencius‘s writings as Confucian school of thoughts 
(Ru Chia). 
64
 Ibid, 14-21, Chichung Huang, The Analects of Confucius: A Literal Translation with an Introduction and 
Notes (1997) 8-13, and Li Fu Chen, The Confucian Way: A New and Systematic Study of ‗The Four Books‘ 
(1986) 1-11. 
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there have been many translations of Confucius‘s work into English and other languages,65 
the number of interpretations in the last two thousand years had been enormous, including 
some groups of academics known as Neo-Confucian. Furthermore, Confucian doctrines had 
been deciphered and applied onto modern research from many disciplines like anthropology, 
law, politics, management, economics, Asian studies, Chinese literature, and theology.
66
 And 
there had been countless of work critiquing his ideas. 
 
Another thing to note is that the terminologies and concepts used in Confucius‘s texts are 
often interlinked with each other in a circular sense (at times the meanings seemed to be 
repetitive), this atypical in Chinese philosophy. The same term could be applied across many 
contexts, whilst the meanings vary accordingly, the central ideas can be applied to 
specifically or generally. This means interpreting of his work can be narrowly understood in 
the literal sense, or broadly characterised by analogy and inductive reasoning.
67
 Thus the 
study of Confucian doctrines can be an inexhaustible adventure. 
 
A caveat to note, Confucius's writings were not intended to be applied to corporate 
governance or business regulations per se. For the purpose of this research, inferences from 
the three books (as named in the above) and contemporary works will be drawn on at a 
conceptual level, and the interpretation adopted in would be secular,
68
 liberal and open 
textured. The analysis of his work will be selective and restricted to matters related to this 
research. 
 
As mentioned in the above, Confucian values are not only part of Hong Kong‘s heritage, it is 
embedded into the beliefs and value system. In 1993, the World Bank labelled Hong Kong as 
one of the East Asian economic miracle (also known as one of the four tigers).
69
 This report 
                                                 
65
 One of the most widely used English translations of Confucius‘s work is -  James Legge, Confucius: 
Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean (1971) – for the purpose of this research 
all quotes in English of Confucius‘s work will be drawn from this translation. 
66
 For example see Daniel Bell and Hahm Chaibong (eds.) Confucianism for the Modern World (2003) 
67
 For more on understanding Chinese philosophy see Bo Mou (ed.) Comparative Approaches to Chinese 
Philosophy (2003). 
68
 For theological dimensions of Confucian ethics see Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and 
the West: A Comparative Study (1981) 25-57. 
69
 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (1993) 2. 
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stated that a key engine of growth its high levels of productivity.
70
 Several researches 
asserted that the levels of productivity were driven by Asian values and work ethics inspired 
by Confucian ethics.
71
 Results from Hofstede and Bond‘s survey showed that Hong Kong is 
one of the four countries Asian countries scoring high in ‗Confucian dynamism‘.72 They 
found, ‗it then appeared that the country scores on Confucian Dynamism derived from this 
exercise are strongly associated with those countries‘ economic growth. Thus we have found 
a cultural link to an economic phenomenon.‘73 Some of the Confucian values accredited for 
the high economic growth include hard work, education, thrift and social order.
74
  
 
Confucian values are also said to be the ‗glue‘ that binds Hong Kong‘s network of family-
owned businesses. Redding notes that, 
The Chinese networks derive their legitimacy and attraction from certain cultural 
predispositions, most of which are traceable to Confucian values. The very success of 
these networks encourages other cultural predispositions, such as patrimonial 
authority patterns, which give high organizational influence to key individuals, and an 
ethic of trustworthiness, which provides discipline and moral justifications to the 
system. This reciprocation releases other forms of efficiency, which can be explained 
technically in terms of low transaction costs, strategic flexibility, and a capacity for 
innovation, all of which facilitate a continuation of successful receipt in the future.
75
 
 
The order of things in civil society according to Confucius can be found in ‗the five 
relationships‘.76 The five relationships are those between: 1) father and son; 2) ruler and 
subject; 3) husband and wife; 4) old and young (or elder and younger siblings); and 5) 
between friends.
77
 Chen argue that, 
Each of these relationships is governed by an ethics of mutuality and entails 
reciprocal moral obligations on the part of each party. There was a deep recognition 
that the human individual does not live in isolation and is not existentially self-
                                                 
70
 Ibid, 8. Note that a later publication by the World Bank in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis disputed 
several earlier claims of the factors of economic growth. See Joseph Stiglitz and Shahid Yusuf (ed.), Rethinking 
the East Asian Miracle (2001). 
71
 El Kahal, above n. 56, 13. 
72
 Geert Hofstede and Michael Bond, ‗The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth‘ 
(1988) 16(4) Organizational Dynamics, 5, 16-17. 
73
 Ibid, 17. 
74
 El Kahal, above n. 56, 13. 
75
 Gordon Redding, ‗Weak Organizations and Strong Linkages: Managerial Ideology and Chinese Family 
Business Networks‘ in Gary Hamilton (ed.) Asian Business Networks (1996) 27 at 40. 
76
 Albert Chen, ‗Confucian Legal Culture and Its Modern Fate‘ in Raymond Wacks (ed.) The New Legal Order 
in Hong Kong (1999) 505, 515. 
77
 Ibid. 
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sufficient; he or she lives amidst a network of human social relationships, and full 
realisation of his or her nature, self, and destiny is a function of the fulfilment of the 
moral obligations associated with the social roles defined by these relationships.
78
 
These five relationships were subsequently transformed into the concept of sangang
79
 (three 
bonds). Out of the three bonds, two of which (king and subject, father and son) relates to 
governance, the duties and obligations arising are zhong
80
 (loyalty to the King) and xiao
81
  
(filial piety– son towards father).82 Violation of these moral duties and legal obligations in 
ancient China constitute a cardinal sin and serious crime.
83
 Chen adds that, ‗[o]n the positive 
side, it may also be said that the ‗three bonds‘ made a major contribution to Chinese 
civilisation by ensuring the maintenance of  relatively stable social and political order most of 
the time during the two millennia.‘84 On the negative side, the system of sangang had been 
exploited to justify absolute obedience. The ultimate goal of sangang is to create social 
harmony and harmonious relationships,
85
 based on moral values and ethical norms.
86
 
 
In Chapter ten of The Great Learning, Confucius said to make the kingdom peaceful, the 
King should lead by example so his subjects will learn to be virtuous and act ethically,
87
 and 
the principle of reciprocity is the yardstick by which he regulates himself.
88
 A good ruler he 
has to first attention to his own moral motivation because being virtuous he will gain men. 
Having men will help him obtain territory, and having territory will bring him revenue and 
                                                 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 This refers to the obligations of official to monarch, son to father, wife to husband. See Kai-wing Chow, The 
Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classical, and Lineage Discourse (1994) 11 
80
 There are several meanings, ‗faithfulness‘, ‗loyalty‘ and ‗sincere commitment‘. See Bo Mou (ed.) 
Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (2003) 166.  
81
 This is central in ancient China‘s political ideology, social life, and legal system. It means more than looking 
after one‘s parents, but also showing reverence to them. See Lusina Ho, ‗Traditional Confucian Values and 
Western Legal Frameworks: The Law of Succession‘ in Daniel Bell and Hahm Chaibong (eds.) Confucianism 
for the Modern World (2003) 288, 291. 
82
 Chen, above n. 79, 516. Note that xiao had been a paramount virtue in China governing parent-child 
relationships. Confucius felt children are morally obligated to show appreciation for the sacrifices their parents 
have given over the years in upbringing of the child. In addition, he believed that children should obey, care and 
revere their parents. See Chichung Huang, The Analects of Confucius: A Literal Translation with an 
Introduction and Notes (1997) 22-23, 52-54. 
83
 Albert Chen, ‗Confucian Legal Culture and Its Modern Fate‘ in Raymond Wacks (ed.) The New Legal Order 
in Hong Kong (1999) 505 at 516. 
84
 Ibid, 515. 
85
 Sonia El Kahal, Business in Asia Pacific: Text and Cases (2001) 134, and Kim-chong Chong, Early 
Confucian Ethics (2007) 11-12. 
86
 Daniel Bell and Hahm Chaibong, Introduction: The Contemporary Relevance of Confucianism‘ in Daniel Bell 
and Hahm Chaibong (eds.) Confucianism for the Modern World (2003) 1, 23-28. 
87
 Legge, above n. 62, 373-374. 
88
 Ibid, 374. 
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wealth. The King should thus use the resources wisely for the betterment of his subjects. 
Therefore, virtue is the root and wealth is the consequence.
89
  
 
Confucius said, in order for the King to rule the state well, it is necessary to regulate the 
family first.
90
 Chapter 9 of The Great Learning states,   
From the loving example of one family a whole State becomes courtesies the whole 
State becomes courteous,…[t]he ruler must himself be possessed of the good 
qualities, and then he may require them in the people. He must not have the bad 
qualities in himself, and then he may require that they shall not be in the 
people…[T]hus we see how the government of the State depends on the regulation of 
the family.
91
   
According to Confucius the regulation of the family depends on the cultivation of individual 
morals. Chapter 8 of The Great Learning states, ‗the regulation of one‘s family depends on 
the cultivation of his person…[i]f the person be not cultivated, a man cannot regulate his 
family.‘92 
 
Sangang had been adopted by Kings and Emperors of China for centuries to create a system 
of hierarchical order. Arguably, this had helped perpetuate the feudal system and order of 
things in China. For Confucius these values and ethical principles were a definitive self 
regulatory mechanism, he believed that if individuals can discipline themselves in accordance 
to ethical norms and moral values, laws would be redundant. Applying these moral values on 
a social level through the regulation of families and the state, according to Confucius it is the 
basis for a civilised and compassionate society.
93
  
 
                                                 
89
 Ibid, 375. 
90
 Legge, above n. 62, 370. 
91
 Ibid, 371. 
92
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93
 Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law (1996) 121-144. 
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Apart from the governance of the state, Confucian ethics also influenced China‘s legal 
tradition and jurisprudence.
94
 According to Cao‘s reading of The Analects, Confucius 
believed a nation led by laws is condemned as perpetrators could find ways to avoid 
punishment.
95
 Even if compliance is achieved, they are external instruments, and are 
powerless to transform the inner character,
96
 only morals could rectify wrong behaviour.
97
 
Confucius advocated that the King and his ministers should lead by example through the 
cultivation of moral rules;
98
 law and punishment were considered as secondary instruments or 
as a last resort to maintain social order.
99
  
 
The Chinese traditional legal system unlike the West, failed to provide effective restraints 
against the state and ruler like the use of arbitrary powers. It also failed to protect individuals 
against the arbitrary powers of the state.
100
 To a certain extent, China is similar to the West 
where mercantile disputes were settled by guilds and clans, however little have evolved into 
laws like in many European countries because much are relationship rather than rule based 
standards.
101
 This could help explain why historically, China did not have indigenous laws to 
regulate companies apart from broad principles loosely base on customary practices and 
Confucian ethics supported by clan elders or village mediator-elites.
102
  
 
The seeds of modern Chinese companies (Kongsi)
103
 were sown, according to Wang around 
the period of the Ming Dynasty.
104
 There were not creatures of legal instruments, it emerged 
                                                 
94
 Patricia Blazey and Gisele Kapterian, ‗Traditional Chinese Law‘ in Patricia Blazey and Kay-Wah Chan (eds.) 
The Chinese Commercial Legal System (2008) 36. For more on Chinese jurisprudence see Alex Lau and Angus 
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99
 Cao, above n. 95, 27. 
100
 Peerenboom, above n. 96, 41. 
101
 James Brady, Justice and Politics in People‘s China: Legal Order or Continuing Revolution? (1982) 38-39. 
102
 Ibid, 35-9. Note that company laws were transplanted from Japan, which were modelled according to 
European laws, for more see Angus Young, ‗Conceptualising a Chinese Corporate Governance Framework: 
Tensions between Tradition, Ideologies and Modernity‘ (2009) 20(7) International Company and Commercial 
Law Review, 235.  
103
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out of an informal commercial arrangements used by Chinese migrant workers in Southeast 
Asia in the 18
th
 Century.
105
 Chinese customs and Confucian ethics governed early Chinese 
corporations, as there were virtually no laws regulating these entities.
106
 Prior the 20
th
 
Century, the lack of laws regulating businesses in China had much to do with the Confucian 
mindset in governance and regulations.
107
  
 
In sum, the Confucian order of society is mapped out under a hierarchical order of three core 
relationships stipulated in sangang. Ultimately, it was aimed at creating social harmony and 
order, based on moral values and ethical norms. Aside from the spiritual references, 
leadership (as a King or father) according to Confucius is built on the notion of ‗moral 
authority‘.108 Accordingly, those who lead must be strive towards moral excellence. 
Therefore the order of things in the Confucian universe follows this sequence (see figure 3) – 
first, self cultivation (with moral excellence, this will bring about self discipline and control), 
then the regulation of a family (affairs at home ought to be orderly and family members live 
harmoniously together), and finally the governance of a state (a good king is like a 
benevolent father who takes care of his subject as he would his own children).
109
 
Figure 3 
                                                                                                                                                        
result of the kongsi concept. A vast number of Chinese-run firms and businesses were born as kongsi--many 
ending up as multinational conglomerates. In the Chinese spirit, derived in large part from Confucian ideals, 
these kongsi members or their descendants prefer not to boast so much of their wealth but to take pride in 
earning worldly and financial success through their work ethic and the combined efforts of many individuals 
devoted to group welfare. See Wikipedia, ‗kongsi‘, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kongsi> at 13 October 2009. 
104
 Wang Tai Peng, The Origins of Chinese Kongsi (1994) 14-5. 
105
 Ibid, 3. 
106
 Angus Young, ‗Conceptualising a Chinese Corporate Governance Framework: Tensions between Tradition, 
Ideologies and Modernity‘ (2009) 20(7) International Company and Commercial Law Review, 235. For more 
discussions on Confucius and Chinese corporate law see Teemu Ruskola, ‗Conceptualizing Corporations and 
Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective‘ (2000) 52 (6) Stanford Law 
Review, 1599. 
107
 For more on China‘s early attempts to modernise their laws and legal system see Vivienne Bath, ‗Reforms in 
Chinese Law from 1901 to 1911‘ (Unpublished BA (Hons) Thesis, Australian National University, 1977). 
108
 John Kekes, ‗Pluralism and Moral Authority‘ in Kim-chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan, and C. L. Tan (eds.) The 
Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches (2003) 75-92.  
109
 Legge, above n. 62, 369-370.  
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The two key principles of Confucian ethics that underpins the above discuss about sangang 
relevant to Chinese governance and jurisprudence is the notions of li and ren. The Chinese 
character of li is rooted in rituals performed during the worship of the heavens.110 The rituals 
and rites were codes of propriety, a set of rules and institutions by which nobles and 
commoners conduct themselves in their relations with the gods and spirits as well as with 
other human beings. Thus this code of propriety encompassed all aspects of human life. It is 
also stringent etiquettes governing the organisation of the state, families and social relations. 
The purpose of li was used by rulers as governmental measures to achieve humane rule.111 It 
also aims to instil motivational attitudes, serves to shape character and moderate behaviour.112 
                                                 
110
 Chichung Huang, The Analects of Confucius: A Literal Translation with an Introduction and Notes (1997) 
19. 
111
 Ibid, 20. 
112
 Kim-chong Chong, Early Confucian Ethics (2007) 1, 2. 
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This is accomplished through self cultivation.113 For Confucius, ‗self cultivation focuses on 
training oneself to follow the li (rituals) of the social value system conforming orderly to the 
social norms.‘114 Also the practice of li fosters the growth of trust between people and the 
discipline of li helps people cohabitate harmoniously by resolving conflict with non 
confrontational postures and predisposition towards compromised resolutions.115  
 
 
As noted in the above, li was one of two schools of Chinese legal tradition.
116
 According to 
Cao‘s translation of The Analects, Confucius believed that a nation led by laws is condemned 
because perpetrators would find ways to avoid punishment. Even if compliance is achieved, 
laws can only demand physical obedience, and so are unable to rehabilitate the 
wrongdoers,
117
 only morals could rectify wrong behaviour.
118
 Therefore li was intended to be 
ethical based socialised obligations, which does not invoke penal punishment, instead non-
compliance draws indignation from the community. It is expected that the wrong doer or 
perpetrator feels shameful for the wrongful act or behaviour and be repentant.119 There is an 
educative facet to the notion of li, it is a behavioural norm that, ‗operates by being 
internalized by the person, so that in effect it becomes part of his or her entire being.‘120 
 
The moral foundation of li is the concept of ren. Chong claimed that, ‗Ren is absent when li is 
performed without proper spirit, and the rituals of li, seen in this light, have an education 
                                                 
113
 Robin Wang, ‗The Principled Benevolence: A Synthesis of Kantian and Confucian Moral Judgement‘ in Bo 
Mou (ed.) Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (2003) 122, 130. Note that self cultivation is not self 
actualisation. Self actualisation promotes self interest of individuals for the sake of individuals, whereas self 
cultivation is the dedication to achieve moral excellence. See pages 130-131. 
114
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Law Review, 155. 
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Chaibong (eds.) Confucianism for the Modern World (2003) 31 at 43.  
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function in bringing about the attitudes and values incorporating ren.
121
 For Confucius ren is 
the essence of perfecting one‘s virtues or perfection of human character.122 It is also central to 
Confucian ethics and the foundation of the Confucian order. In essence, a leader has to 
internalise the morals through the exercise of li moderated by the affection of ren to produce 
social harmony and ethical conduct.
123
  
 
From a critical perspective the Confucian inspired governance system appears to be at odds 
with profit maximisation objectives of corporations, with the emphasis on li and ren. Then 
again, these values are central to enhancing accountability. Looking back at history, China‘s 
economy thrived for centuries under a Confucian based order and governance. China had 
sophisticated trade networks and robust financial/credit system with relatively little policy or 
legal intervention by past Imperial governments.
124
 In the modern business context Romar 
argued that, ‗Confucianism is a useful foundation for organizational ethics because it 
addresses the reality of life in organizations and assigns responsibilities only in the context of 
the situation.‘125  
 
More important, Confucian doctrines are moral based code of conduct, intended to cultivate 
one‘s moral values. It is aimed at internalising these values to govern individual conduct, like 
a self disciplinary mechanism, but in practice, rely on social coercion to shape behaviour and 
reframe from immortal or unethical conduct. And it lacks formalised due process or detailed 
prescriptive standards to govern individual behaviour, Confucius‘s teaching are also 
vulnerable to varied and creative interpretations. 
 
Nevertheless, the corporate governance practices in Hong Kong and to some extent in China, 
are influenced by Confucian values. This poses certain challenges from a legal perspective, 
because for Hong Kong company laws based almost entirely based on British Companies 
                                                 
121
 Kim-chong Chong, Early Confucian Ethics (2007) 19. Ren can be characterise and defined as ―benevolence‖, 
―kindness‖, ―goodness‖, ―human-heartedness‖ and ―humanity‖. 
122
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123
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125
 Edward Romar, ‗Virtue is Good Business: Confucianism as a Practical Business Ethic‘ (2002) 38, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 119, at 119. 
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Act,126 and for China company laws are heavily influenced by European countries.127 So the 
laws as it stands currently in Hong Kong and China do not incorporate any elements of 
Chinese tradition values. Thus, there is a clear mismatch between the prescription of legal 
standards and companies who practices paternalistic governance. Evidently, this disparity 
requires urgent attention. Why? Because markets need clear and robust laws to sustain 
economic growth, for Asian countries this has becoming an area of growing importance as 
‗bottle-necks‘ in the economy begin to become visible.128  
 
Meta-regulation and Regulating Corporate Governance: 
Levi-Faur note that the era of deregulation and privatisation in the 1990s had spurred the 
creation of a new socio-economic and political order where an increase delegation of 
regulatory responsibility from state to private institutions coupled with new technologies and 
greater inter/intra-institutional coordination resulted in the proliferation of self-regulatory 
arrangements.129 And yet efficient and effective self-regulation will not come about without 
the supervision and support of the state. This is where meta-regulation plays a key role. It is a 
concept that evolved out of a web of self regulatory relationships between law and society or 
law and the economy.
130
 It is the ‗regulation of self regulation‘,131 where regulators monitor 
and assess the self-regulatory efforts of regulated entities.
132
 Self regulation has been labelled 
as management based regulation. This approach involves companies developing their own 
process and management system standards designed to comply with the objectives found in 
substantive law.133 Meta-regulation permits complex interaction of different sets of legal and 
non-legal ordering to coexist under pluralistic structure.
134
 This theory also builds on 
responsive regulation originally developed by John Braithwaite and in many ways tries to 
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overcome or address the criticism or weakness of this regulatory framework,
135
 as well 
responding to past regulatory failures and crises from high profile disasters.
136
 Its focus is on 
outcomes, principles, and processes instead of prescriptive rules, while not neglecting the 
merits of legal instruments.
137
 Sinclair notes, ‗rather than regulating prescriptively, meta-
regulation seeks to stimulate modes of self organization within the firm in such a way as to 
encourage internal self-critical reflection about its performance.‘138 According to Haines,  
This form of regulation has many advantages, particularly where causes of harm are 
complex and require constant vigilance. The promise of meta-regulation as a response 
to catastrophic risk lies in its potential to bring together an organization‘s 
understanding of risk and appropriate methods of risk reduction with the demands and 
expectations of the regulator.
139
 
 
 
Parker wrote, ‗meta-regulating law could connect with communities, networks and 
organisations that are rich with the possibility of regulating themselves and one another 
responsibly, and work with that possibility to invigorate and enliven their inner commitment 
to responsibility.‘140 Meta-regulatory law also recognises that law itself is regulated by non-
legal regulation, and should therefore seek to adapt itself to plural forms of regulation.
141
 
Therefore it is capable of extending beyond the prescriptions of responsive regulation to 
absorb the merits of smart regulation and nodal governance into a more integrative regulatory 
framework.
142
 
 
By taking into account macro factors like social relations, economic pressures, and political 
considerations, as well as micro issues like norms, meta-regulatory. Meta-regulation 
motivates, moulds, and augments the self regulatory impetus to aid better compliance.
143
 The 
development of meta-regulation came about with the realisation that rules as an edict 
imposed on individuals might not be an effective regulator of conduct and behaviour. Other 
non-legal factors like sociological and ideological imperatives, as well as political economic 
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constrains altogether play a regulatory function.
144
  Criminologists argued that these 
contextual factors can influence individual behaviour; hence the line between social 
environment and individualism is not a clear one as they interact with each other.
145
  
 
At the macro-level, this is where the socio-economic, political, and international pressures 
shape how regulatory instruments (‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ laws) are formulated, and the regulatory 
activities (monitor and enforcement) of various governmental (regulators and enforcers) and 
non-governmental (professional bodies and litigators) regulatory bodies. Locally, economic 
pressures and political factors are key drivers of legal reforms. The relationship between 
markets and laws is a mutually supporting one.
146
 The process of law making and reform is 
often a product of political compromise. External influences from international institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund, OECD, or regional bodies like the European Union and 
Asian Development is important. They can influence and shape national regulations and 
standards through various forums and exchanges, thus regulations or recommendations made 
by these institutions constitute ‗web of influence‘ on national regulatory debates and policies 
adopted.
147
  
 
At a micro level values take on a regulatory role.
148
 Values can be social (cultural) or ethical 
based, or a combination of both. Norms can be understood as the socialisation process and 
institutionalisation of individual values.
149
 Norms are social conventions that are often rooted 
in moral values steering towards elements of socially and ethically accepted ends.
150
  
 
Whilst the above forms the basis of formal regulatory and enforcement functions, it has a 
propensity to oblige superficial compliance of rules because of the fear of sanctions by the 
various authorities.
151
 It does not necessarily shape or alter the values and beliefs of regulated 
entities and individuals. A key assumption of meta-regulation is that ethical values are 
incorporated in social norms. But social norms contain socialised attitudes acting like an 
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externally imposed legal rule or standard, except for the fact that it emulates accepted social 
practises and conforms to social expectations. From an individual perspective, socialised 
norms might not create sufficient motivation to comply. Thus a separate code of conduct 
based on ethical values can create a heightened awareness at a conscious level to comply with 
the objects laid down self regulatory regimes, as well as appealing to one‘s conscience to do 
so. Then again, this builds on the assumption that regulatees recognise the merits of these 
codes and voluntarily wishes to comply because he/she knows they either should or ought to 
without the need to look up hard or soft rules. By complying with such ethical codes, they 
would unconsciously be adhering to the spirit and objects of the law.   
 
By characterisation, ethical values are normative and subjective principles dealing with what 
one ‗ought to do‘, a standard of behaviour one imposes on oneself to conform with.152 Ethical 
values can serve as a motivator to comply with the law, not out of obedience or fear of 
penalty, rather from a sense of civic duty.
153
 Ethical or moral values are embedded in the 
works of both Weber and Durkheim‘s conception of law and regulations.154 Durkheim sees 
the law as ‗essential‘ to the constitution of social solidarity because they are the most stable 
and precise element of expression that reflects the society‘s collective morality.155 In contrast, 
Weber sees the law and regulations as a form of convention backed by sanctions that is 
administered by enforcement agencies. His emphasis is on the inter-relationships between 
laws, religion, political agencies onto economic structures and development.
156
 However, on 
closer scrutiny, Weber also argued that protestant ethical values influenced the development 
of capitalism, bureaucracy and the rational-legal state in the West.
157
 In short, ethical values 
have a regulatory function in terms of governance and compliance. 
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Whilst ethical values can be community based or cultural specific on the one hand, on the 
other hand, some beliefs are universal like for the betterment of society, therefore, they are 
flexible and malleable tools and instruments to influence human behaviour. Ethical values are 
also capable of internalising standards of behaviour that is conducive and consistent with the 
objectives found in formal regulatory instruments like in laws and regulations, as long as they 
are based on universal or common beliefs. However, some cultures communicate and achieve 
these beliefs differently. And it may also differ in the way how each culture achieves these 
ethical ends. And unlike hard rules and laws, it is more flexible and broad, as well as less 
intrusive with the imposition of penalties for non-compliance.  
 
Meta-regulation is not without weaknesses. As illustrated in figure 4, meta-regulation 
consists of a web of formal and informal regulatory instruments and stakeholders. It remains 
vulnerable through selectively addressing risks, offering unpalatable expectations to resolve 
complex socio-economic or emotionally charged regulatory problems.
158
 Since there are 
formal and formal regulatory instruments, as well as governmental and non-governmental 
regulators, the issue of coherent regulatory objectives comes into question. Even if those 
objectives are similar, they are no guarantee the conflicts or discrepancies would not 
materialize overtime, when disputes between rival groups or between government policies 
and stakeholders emerge from time to time. Also the coordination between governmental and 
non-governmental agencies might not be straightforward. This suggestions discrepancy 
between different sets of formal and informal regulatory standards would emerge from time 
to time, thus creating gaps in regulatory ends. Furthermore at an organisational level, the gaps 
between the intentions of companies or regulators and the outcomes could be substantial, and 
resistant by individuals could also be difficult to overcome.159 Conversely, meta-regulation is 
comprehensive in terms of its design, incorporation of formal and informal regulatory 
agencies, and ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ laws. Altogether create a web like effect upon individuals to 
comply with regulatory objectives. Furthermore, it is capable of integrating diverse norms 
and values that maybe culture specific with the aim of achieving a common regulatory 
outcome. Even though this ideal or normative regulatory model is perhaps over ambitious in 
integrating complex human interactions and behaviour, early empirical results of the use of 
                                                 
158
 Haines, above n. 134, 2. 
159
 Gunningham and Sinclair, above n. 132, 872. 
The Fifth Annual Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Hong Kong, 8 -9 January 2010 
 
27 
Paper by Angus Young 
meta-regulation on a range of issues like environmental enforcement and tax compliance is 
encouraging.
160
 
 
In Asia, meta-regulation also gained momentum with massive economic liberation program 
in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. 161 And thus re-regulation of the privatised 
entities was required to ensure good governance was mandatory.162 Hong Kong has long 
tradition of minimum governmental intervention dating back to the Colonial administration, 
self regulation amongst the elite business community was arguably the key to island city‘s 
rapid economic growth. For example, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange had long been self 
regulated body.163 It was not until the early in 1990s after a government enquiry that leads to 
reforms being introduced.164 Even so, the listing rules are not backed by statutes.  
 
Even though China is still under the considerable influence of the state, its massive 
privatisation and listing of state-owned enterprises in its stock markets, greater delegation of 
regulatory responsibility to corporations will gradually be introduced because of 
inefficiencies of a command and control regulatory system in a modern economy. 
 
With regards to the modern self regulatory regime and traditional Chinese values. For 
Centuries China had been adopting customary practices and social norms drawn from 
Confucian ethics to regulate commerce and trade, therefore China has a track record of self 
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regulatory systems.165 As noted earlier in this paper, Confucian ethics uses moral excellence 
as self disciplinary mechanism. And it internalises those moral values to ensure individuals 
act accordingly. Therefore, applying meta-regulatory instruments in modern China and Hong 
Kong would in effect legitimise some elements of Confucian doctrines. Of course this does 
not mean it mimics China‘s traditional methods of regulation, new procedures and processes 
in the modern meta-regulatory framework will ensure it complies with current objects of the 
laws are actualised.  
 
Nevertheless, traditional values will play a key role in the success of meta-regulatory 
framework in China as well as Hong Kong, especially in the regulation of corporate 
governance since Confucian ethics are already the foundation of paternalistic governance 
widely practiced in Hong Kong and is slowly gathering pace in China‘s private family-owned 
businesses. 
Figure 4 
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Source: adapted from Haines (2006) 
Conclusions: 
The aim of this paper is to propose an ambitious idea - that is to incorporate traditional 
Chinese value into modern meta-regulatory framework to regulate corporate governance. I 
started with a discussion about what is corporate governance because like any fashionable 
issue it runs the risk of being misrepresented or misunderstood due to ‗knee jerk‘ reactions, 
passing impressions, or just ignorance.  
 
Unlike management which focuses on daily operational matters, corporate governance, 
‗refers to the arrangements for its ultimate control, involving who sets its direction, and who 
monitors and finally takes responsibility for the organisation‘s performance.‘166 As noted that 
is an ever growing list of theories prescribe by various disciplines - each discipline draws 
from its own bounded set of assumptions and methodology to derive at conclusions or 
normative sets of prescriptions.
167
 Even if some of those theories are over simplistic or 
unrealistic, it adds a piece to the puzzle of what corporate governance encompasses. More 
important, all the theories attest to the underlying object of governance is accountability of 
directors. Even though, it sounds easy the board performs many functions and this paper has 
pigeon holed them into three key areas. While we can put in place more structures, add new 
protocols and processes to ensure greater transparency and procedural fairness, relational 
matters are dynamic and often culturally influenced. Although fiduciary duties mandate 
directors to be loyal to the company, the notion of loyalty and more importantly conflicts of 
interests is quite different in China and Hong Kong from those in the West.  
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Paternalistic governance in China and Hong Kong is a product of Chinese traditional values, 
namely from a Confucian doctrines. The concept of sangang presents a clear hierarchical 
order in the Confucian universe. This order gives unprecedented power (compared to 
Western concepts) to the in-charge, namely the King over his subjects, a husband over his 
wife, and a father over the children. Thus in Chinese family-owned businesses, the father 
who is usually the founder and chair/CEO reigns all matters in company liken a King over his 
subjects. Whilst this might be an extreme account of the father‘s control in a Chinese family-
owned businesses, the decisions of the chair/CEO is often unquestioned by others members 
of the family on the board. Notions of conflicts of interest might not register as an important 
matter because the Chair/CEO might think his actions are for the interest of his family and 
justifies it as benevolent. But upon closer scrutiny Confucian values are morally based, where 
concepts of li and ren forms the core values of benevolent leadership. From this perspective 
conflicts are unacceptable behaviour, thus should either be avoided or resolve to the 
satisfaction of parties involved.  
 
As noted meta-regulation is a new regulatory innovation adopted across many modern 
Western countries, like the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the US. This is a system of self 
regulatory frameworks where a broader view of regulation is embraced. This came out of the 
realisation that command and control type regulation is ineffective in particular, in the field 
of commercial regulation. It takes into account norms and values, as well as the role of 
various stakeholders with vested interested in regulating the behaviour of the targeted 
regulatees. Since the regulation of trade and commerce in ancient China was predominantly 
self regulatory through customs inspired by Confucian ethics focusing on self discipline as a 
regulatory mechanism to shape behaviour and norms, hence a clear benefit for adopting meta-
regulatory framework in modern China and Hong Kong - it is not an entirely alien concept. 
Besides, Confucian ethics would enhance regulation with the use of an ethical code of 
conduct or guidelines as a form of ‗soft law‘. This would not only improve regulatory 
compliance, but also allow these codes or guidelines to include Confucian doctrines. 
Therefore, by aligning China and Hong Kong‘s norms and values in the form of soft laws 
with the hard laws (e.g. director‘s fiduciary duties), the anticipated outcome is a more 
responsive and integrated regulatory regime.  
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Figure 5 
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